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Background: Public health emergencies have the potential to disproportionately impact disadvantaged populations
due to pre-established social and economic inequalities. Internationally, prior to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic,
existing pandemic plans were created with limited public consultation; therefore, the unique needs and
characteristics of some First Nations communities may not be ethically and adequately addressed. Engaging the
public in pandemic planning can provide vital information regarding local values and beliefs that may ultimately
lead to increased acceptability, feasibility, and implementation of pandemic plans. Thus, the objective of the present
study was to elicit and address First Nations community members’ suggested modifications to their community-
level pandemic plans after the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic.
Methods: The study area included three remote and isolated First Nations communities located in sub-arctic Ontario,
Canada. A community-based participatory approach and community engagement process (i.e., semi-directed interviews
(n= 13), unstructured interviews (n= 4), and meetings (n= 27)) were employed. Participants were purposively sampled
and represented various community stakeholders (e.g., local government, health care, clergy, education, etc.) involved in
the community’s pandemic response. Collected data were manually transcribed and coded using deductive and
inductive thematic analysis. The data subsequently informed the modification of the community-level pandemic plans.
Results: The primary modifications incorporated in the community-level pandemic plans involved adding community-
specific detail. For example, ‘supplies’ emerged as an additional category of pandemic preparedness and response,
since including details about supplies and resources was important due to the geographical remoteness of the study
communities. Furthermore, it was important to add details of how, when, where, and who was responsible for
implementing recommendations outlined in the pandemic plans. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities of the
involved organizations were further clarified.
Conclusions: Our results illustrate the importance of engaging the public, especially First Nations, in pandemic
planning to address local perspectives. The community engagement process used was successful in incorporating
community-based input to create up-to-date and culturally-appropriate community-level pandemic plans. Since these
pandemic plans are dynamic in nature, we recommend that the plans are continuously updated to address the* Correspondence: ncharani@uwaterloo.ca
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/268communities’ evolving needs. It is hoped that these modified plans will lead to an improved pandemic response
capacity and health outcomes, during the next public health emergency, for these remote and isolated First Nations
communities. Furthermore, the suggested modifications presented in this paper may help inform updates to the
community-level pandemic plans of other similar communities.Background
Public health emergencies, such as an influenza pandemic,
have the ability to cause high morbidity and mortality rates
in humans [1]. Research indicates that disadvantaged
populations will be disproportionately affected by an influ-
enza pandemic, thereby exacerbating previously estab-
lished social and economic inequalities [2,3]. For instance,
some First Nations communities suffer from conditions of
overcrowded housing and extreme poverty, in addition to
inadequate access to many of the amenities of life (e.g.,
running water, health care, etc.) [4-6]. Geographically re-
mote (i.e., nearest service center that provides access to
Government of Canada’s programs and services with
year-round road access is located over 350 kilometers
away) and isolated (i.e., only accessible by planes year-
round) First Nations communities typically face add-
itional challenges, such as, limited transportation of
required supplies and resources (especially during harsh
weather situations) and continuous shortages of health
care personnel [7-10]. Indeed, Canada’s First Nations,
especially populations living in geographically remote
communities, were severely impacted by the recent
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic (pH1N1) [6,11-13].
During the pH1N1 response, some remote and isolated
First Nations communities reported problems, such as,
confusion and lack of preparedness, owing to ill-defined
roles and responsibilities of government bodies oversee-
ing the delivery of health care and insufficient details in
community-level pandemic plans [14].
Another public health emergency is inevitable [15];
therefore, countries worldwide are encouraged to have ef-
fective pandemic plans in place to minimize the associated
social and economic disruption [2,16]. Typically, national
pandemic plans around the world have involved limited
public consultation, and instead have been heavily guided
by government and public health agencies, and panels of
expert scientists [17-20]. However, it is important that
recommended actions in pandemic plans are accepted by
the public and can be realistically executed at the commu-
nity level [20]. Research has shown that public engagement
in pandemic planning can aid in understanding commu-
nity perspectives and local values [21,22].
Furthermore, since all individuals are affected by an in-
fluenza pandemic, a societal approach to pandemic plan-
ning is recommended [2,17,22]. Unfortunately, various
disadvantaged populations have not been sufficiently
involved in the pandemic planning process [23-26]. For
instance, Canada’s Assembly of First Nations noted thatFirst Nations had not been sufficiently involved in the
development of federal and provincial pandemic plans to
date [27]. Ethically addressing the needs of disadvantaged
populations should be a cornerstone of pandemic plan-
ning [3]. Disadvantaged populations best understand
how they will be affected by a public health emergency
and are able to identify barriers to current public health
recommendations, placing them in a position to create
innovative mitigation strategies [23]. Thus, engaging the
public, especially disadvantaged populations, can aid in
providing pandemic policy planners with information
about the unique, local issues they face, which may lead
to more successful implementation of pandemic plans
and potentially mitigate the inequity that may occur dur-
ing an influenza pandemic [5,22,23].
Studies have shown that it is important for research
findings to be promptly and optimally utilized to change
current practice, thus enhancing the knowledge transla-
tion process of linking research to action [28-31]. In
Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
defines the term knowledge translation as, “a dynamic
and iterative process that includes synthesis, dissemin-
ation, exchange and ethically-sound application of know-
ledge to improve the health of Canadians, provide more
effective health services and products and strengthen the
health care system” [32]. The present study is an ex-
ample of knowledge translation where qualitative infor-
mation was collected from participants residing in three
remote and isolated First Nations communities of sub-
arctic Ontario, Canada, and used to modify the existing
community-level pandemic plans. A knowledge transla-
tion approach was appropriate for this study, as it aimed
to bridge the knowledge-to-action gap regarding how to
engage disadvantaged populations in the pandemic plan-
ning process [28,30]. The purpose of this paper is to de-
scribe the community-based participatory approach and
community engagement process used, and to highlight




Three remote and isolated First Nations communities
were included in the present study since residents had ver-
bally expressed an interest in modifying their community-
level pandemic plans to better address their unique living
conditions during the next public health emergency. A
community-based participatory approach was used as
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successful when working with Aboriginal communities
[33-35]. This approach values collaboration with the com-
munity throughout the research process [33]. Thus, a
community-based advisory group was formed of represen-
tatives from the communities’ health centers and Band
Councils (i.e., local First Nations governing body formed
of elected community members) and they played a large,
collaborative role in designing the study, approving the
interview questions, validating the results, and dissem-
inating the study’s findings [14,36]. Additionally, re-
search participants were actively involved and engaged
throughout the process of modifying their respective
community’s pandemic plan. Ethics approval for this
research was granted by the University of Waterloo’s
Office of Research Ethics.
Study area and characteristics
The three study communities (referred to as Community
A, B, and C for anonymity purposes) are remote and iso-
lated First Nations communities located in northern
Ontario, Canada; thus, the communities’ governmental
organizational structure (i.e., local, provincial, and federal)
responsible for the delivery of health services during a pub-
lic health emergency were similar [37]. The Band Council
of each study community plays a large role in making deci-
sions regarding how health care is delivered [37]. Also, each
community has a federally-funded health center, which
provides community public health care and education [37].
Acute and/or chronic primary health care is provided by
nurses working in the extended role at either a federally-
funded nursing clinic or provincially-funded hospital [37].
Study population, data collection, and analyses
Each study community had a community-level pandemic
plan in place prior to pH1N1, which will be referred
herein as the 1st generation pandemic plan. Being ethically
and culturally appropriate for the region, informed verbal
consent was obtained from participants prior to conducting
the semi-directed interviews, unstructured interviews, and
community pandemic committee meetings [36,38]. The
qualitative data collected from the community engagement
process guided the modifications to each community’s 1st
generation pandemic plan (Figure 1).
Semi-directed interviews
A round of interviews were conducted by the authors
from February 9 to 23, 2010, with participants (n = 13)
who were purposively chosen from each study commu-
nity according to their government (i.e., local, provincial,
or federal) role during their community’s response to
pH1N1 (Table 1). The purpose of the interviews was to
gain retrospective insight into the relationship between
what was outlined in the community’s pandemic planand what their pandemic response actually was [14]. In
order to understand the barriers participants faced and
suggested improvements for the pandemic response, the
interview questions were based on the aspects of a health
sector pandemic response outlined in academic literature
[7,14]. Interviews were semi-directed in nature; thus,
open-ended questions and frequent probes were used,
allowing for participants to expand on points they per-
ceived to be noteworthy in a confidential setting [39].
Each interview was conducted in English (as requested
by the participants) at a time and place convenient for
them. Additionally, upon consent, notes and audio
recordings of the interviews were taken.
Interviews were manually transcribed verbatim and
analyzed using a combination of deductive and inductive
thematic coding by the author (NAC) and confirmed by
the co-author (LJST) [40,41]. Following a template or-
ganizing approach, the seven sections of the First
Nations and Inuit Health Branch – Ontario Region Pan-
demic Influenza Plan (FNIHB-OR PIP) were used as a
coding template to deductively code data [42,43]. After
reviewing the interview transcripts, segments of data re-
lating to supplies and equipment (previously coded as
‘health services’) emerged as a new code (called ‘sup-
plies’) via inductive coding [44].
The resulting eight codes formed the framework for
each community’s 2nd generation pandemic plan. Dif-
ferent colours were used as an organizational tool to
highlight proposed modifications ascertained from the
collected data suggested by the following: participants
from their respective community; participants from the
other two study communities; and relevant academic
literature. Since all communities shared similar living
conditions, other study communities’ suggestions were
also presented as these may have been relevant to the
other communities.
Unstructured interviews
Modified unstructured interviews were conducted by the
author (NAC) from May 31 to June 10, 2010, with the
health director/supervisor and/or nurse-in-charge (n = 4)
of each study community’s health center, as he/she
assumed a lead role during the public health emergency
response and had the authority to comment on all
aspects of the community’s pandemic response. During
the interviews, each page of the 2nd generation pandemic
plan was reviewed, which provided the opportunity for
participants to review and discuss the proposed colour-
coded modifications. The interviews were conversational
in nature, and employed follow-up and specifying ques-
tions [45]. For instance, questions were asked to obtain
additional details about the community’s alternate care
site (i.e., opened sites which provide supplementary pri-













Figure 1 Stages of modifying community-level pandemic plans of three remote and isolated First Nations communities.
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generation pandemic plan.Community pandemic committee meetings
Each of the study communities had formed a community
pandemic committee which comprised of community
stakeholders involved in the community’s pandemic re-
sponse. To engage participation from the community
members, the 3rd generation pandemic plan was subse-
quently presented to each study community’s pandemic
committee (n = 27) for them to view during the period
from July 27 to August 13, 2010. Each meeting was
attended by eight to ten representatives from the follow-
ing: health center, provincial hospital, nursing station,
Band Council, education, clergy, Northern (a store),
water treatment plant, and emergency medical services.
The meetings were facilitated by the author (NAC) to
provide the forum for committee members to review,
validate, and discuss the contents of each page of their
community’s pandemic plan. In addition to each member
receiving a personal copy of the pandemic plan during
the meeting, a computer projector was used to display
the plan and track-changes were used as an
organizational tool to highlight the committee’s feedback.
The resulting 4th generation pandemic plan is the
current version in place; therefore, multiple copies were
distributed among committee members. Additionally,
selected representatives (e.g., Chief, health director/
supervisor) were given digital versatile discs (DVDs) of
their respective community’s pandemic plan; thereby,
allowing the dynamic plan to be accessed and changed
accordingly to the community’s future needs.Table 1 Participants purposively selected for semi-directed in
Federal





The modifications to the study communities’ pandemic
plans were made by the author (NAC) after each round
of citizen input (i.e., semi-directed interviews, unstruc-
tured interviews, and community pandemic committee
meetings) and the primary ones are highlighted below
(Table 2).
1st Generation pandemic plan
Each study community’s existing 1st generation pandemic
plan closely resembled the FNIHB-OR PIP, although
some revisions were made prior to their response to
pH1N1 [46]. These revisions were made after some
representatives from the Band Council and health center
attended pandemic meetings and tabletop exercises. For
instance, in some cases, community-based people were
assigned specific roles during the pandemic response and
appropriate locations in the community were identified
(e.g., where to establish an alternate care site, where to
store vaccines, etc.). However, more information in the
plans was required, as one participant mentioned:
. . . there was a template . . . we work[ed] on that, it
was done back in 2006, I believe at first, but it was
never followed up on, it was not finished thoroughly . . .
then we made . . . additional recommendations here
and there, we added some things that need be . . . but
it was also a learning process for us, because . . . there
were some things that didn’t work or we would just
kind of improvise . . . (Participant # 13).
In general, the communities’ pandemic plans were
divided into three phases (e.g., pre-pandemic, pandemic,terviews
Provincial First Nations Band Council





Table 2 Summary of primary modifications made to
community-level pandemic plans during the community
engagement process
Category Modifications Made
Surveillance Added that health staff are responsible to
monitor absenteeism in schools
and workplaces.
Antivirals and Antibiotics Added details of how antivirals are
transported, received, stored, and who
to contact when more medication
is required.
Health Services Added details about influenza-like illness (ILI)
screening at healthcare facilities.
Added that community health nurses are
to provide basic personal protective
equipment and self-care training.
Added details about the home
support program.
Supplies (added category) Included information about ordering,
maintaining, and providing influenza
pandemic supplies.
Appendix (added section) Added details outlined in Table 3.
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the seven categories of preparedness and response (e.g.,
surveillance, vaccine, antivirals and antibiotics, health
services, emergency response, public health measures,
and communications). Each category included details of
what tasks the community was responsible for, who was
responsible to complete the tasks, and when the tasks
were to be completed by.
2nd Generation pandemic plan
In general, the framework of the communities’ 2nd gener-
ation pandemic plans remained similar; however, ‘sup-
plies’ was added as a category in each phase, consistent
with it being an emerging code from the data. The pri-
mary modifications which resulted in the 2nd generation
pandemic plans involved adding community-specific
details. The ‘health services’ category included more
details about influenza-like illness (ILI) screening at
healthcare facilities, such as, identifying alternate
entrances and waiting areas to isolate ILI cases from
non-ILI cases, and guidelines to follow. Also, it was
added that the community health nurses are responsible
for providing basic personal protective equipment (PPE)
training (e.g., how to wear masks, gowns, gloves, goggles,
etc.) for staff at the health care facilities and community
members when needed. Participants from the study com-
munities reported that there was a lack of supplies for
their pandemic response and ordered supplies did not ar-
rive in a timely fashion. Thus, the new ‘supplies’ category
included information about ordering, maintaining, and
providing influenza pandemic supplies. Participants
requested that additional information be included in
some categories (e.g., vaccines, supplies, public healthmeasures, and communications); therefore, it was later
decided to include this information in an Appendix sec-
tion in the 3rd generation pandemic plan (Table 3).
3rd Generation pandemic plan
In general, after the unstructured interviews, more
community-specific detail was incorporated into the
communities’ pandemic plans. In the ‘surveillance’ category,
it was added that the health staff are responsible to monitor
absenteeism in schools and workplaces on a weekly basis
during the regular influenza season and on a daily basis if
ILI cases in the community increase by ten percent. Some
participants reported that there was confusion about which
health care facility was responsible for receiving and dis-
tributing antivirals. Thus, in the ‘antivirals and antibiotics’
category, specific detail of how antivirals are transported,
received, stored, and who to contact when more medica-
tion is required was added. Furthermore, participants from
all of the study communities stated that there was a gen-
eral lack of community awareness during the pandemic
response. As mentioned by one participant:
. . .we didn’t really get all the education background
. . . until the very last minute . . . they needed more
awareness about it . . . especially in the school system,
cause the kids don’t really understand . . . (Participant
# 7).
Thus, in the ‘health services’ category, it was recom-
mended for the community health nurses to teach self-
care training topics (e.g., general infection control mea-
sures and influenza education, etc.) at the school and
workplaces and for all other community members. Also,
details of the home support program, which would pro-
vide supplies and resources for ill families, were
included. The main modification to highlight was the
added Appendix section, which included sixteen appen-
dices with detailed supplemental information to guide
the community’s pandemic response (Table 3).
4th Generation pandemic plan
After the community pandemic committee meetings,
some noteworthy changes were made to the Appendix
section, which were similar for all three communities. In-
formation regarding the organizers, locations, and special
considerations was added in the alternate care site plans.
Furthermore, a participant had questioned:
. . . the timing of this, the virus, if it happened like, in
the spring, our springs are usually nice and warm, and
where would we store the bodies? (Participant # 10).
Thus, potential locations for a morgue in the commu-
nity were chosen for summer and winter influenza
Table 3 List and description of appendices included in 3rd generation pandemic plans
Title of Appendix Description
World Health Organization Pandemic
Influenza Phases
Describes the pandemic influenza phases (1–6), post-peak period, and post-pandemic period [52].
Canadian Activity Level Describes Canadian Activity Levels 0, 1, and 2 [53].
Mass Immunization Clinic Protocol Describes how to prepare and implement a community mass immunization clinic, including members
involved and main responsibilities (e.g., vaccine safekeeping, staffing, orientation/training required,
safety and security, communication, vaccinating community, and post-clinic issues) [54].
Public Health Agency of Canada:
Mass Immunization Clinics in
Remote & Isolated Communities
Provides the website link for more information about how to implement a mass immunization clinic
specifically in remote and isolated communities [54].
Human Resource Contingency Plans Includes human resource contingency plans for workplaces in the community.
List of Essential Services Lists services in the community that are considered “essential” and must be maintained throughout
a public health emergency.
Alternate Care Site Plan Lists the organizers responsible for establishing an alternate care site, and possible locations in the
community.
Outbreak Control Team and Clinical
Pandemic Response Group/Command
Center
Lists the members and responsibilities of the community outbreak control team and clinical pandemic
response group/command center.
List of Pandemic Influenza Supplies Lists general pandemic influenza supplies that are recommended to have available for the community.
First Nations and Inuit Health Branch
Formulas for Pandemic Influenza Supplies
Provides formulas for calculating how many pandemic influenza supplies should be ordered for
healthcare facilities and workplaces in the community.
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan Includes the community emergency preparedness and response plan.
Corpse Storage and Temporary Morgue Plan Includes the community corpse storage and temporary morgue plan for summer and winter scenarios.
Community Infection Control Measures Describes recommended community infection control measures to mitigate a pandemic (both mild
and severe scenarios) [53]. Included components: public education, infection control measures, where
to access health care, general comfort measures, isolation measures, quarantine measures, travel
restrictions, screening measures, supplies, communication, closing schools/workplaces, and restricting
public gatherings [53].
Templates for Community Notices Includes templates for community notices (both mild and severe scenarios) that can be modified
as needed.
Communication Plan Outlines the community’s communication plan before, during, and after a pandemic. Describes various
methods that can be used to communicate with community members, and the roles of the health
center, community pandemic committee, and Band Council.
Helpful Resources Provides website links (e.g., Health Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, World Health
Organization, etc.) for more information, which was also included in a DVD format for easier access to
the information [2,7,43,53,54].
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and temporary morgue plan. In Community C’s commu-
nication plan, it was added that, if necessary, practi-




Our research employed a community engagement
process which involved (semi-directed and unstructured)
interviews and collaborative debriefing and planning
meetings. By comparing the communities’ 1st and 4th
generation pandemic plans, our results suggest that there
was a vast difference between what was initially outlined
in the plans and what their response actually comprised
of. Most of the resulting modifications incorporated into
the study communities’ pandemic plans involved the
addition of community-specific details and the clarifica-
tion of the roles and responsibilities of involvedorganizations. Our results indicate that it was essential
to the communities to add details of how, when, where,
and who was responsible to implement recommenda-
tions outlined in the pandemic plans. Also, due to the
geographical remoteness of the study communities, it
was important to include details about supplies and
resources in a newly created category. Interestingly, our
results indicate that each of the communities added
similar information (with slight variations) to their pan-
demic plans, which may be attributable to the fact that
all are remote and isolated First Nations communities.
This finding may reflect that while adding community-
specific information to pandemic plans is important, it is
also of great value to generally address the unique condi-
tions of a region.
As a result of the community engagement process
many modifications were made to the communities’ pan-
demic plans; however, some areas still require attention
in the near future. For instance, as recommended by the
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workplace in the community should be included. Also, the
community infection control measures should be updated
according to emerging research, especially regarding which
pandemic mitigation measures are effective in remote and
isolated communities. Since community-level pandemic
plans are dynamic in nature, it is recommended that the
plans are re-assessed and modified with community par-
ticipation on an annual basis and after each public health
emergency in order to meet the evolving needs of the
community.
Our results indicate that the community engagement
process had numerous benefits, in addition to eliciting
valuable community-based input. For instance, the
process employed provided the forum for the community
pandemic committee to debrief about their pH1N1 re-
sponse and to plan accordingly for the next public health
emergency, especially with regards to discussing cultur-
ally sensitive issues, such as morgue locations. This
group forum also provided the opportunity for commit-
tee members to clarify and be more cognizant of their
respective roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, since
the included participants represented various community
stakeholders involved in the community’s pH1N1 re-
sponse and multiple qualitative methods were used, the
process gained insight into the diverse perspectives of
community members living in remote and isolated com-
munities [47].
Amongst the numerous benefits of the study’s
employed community engagement process, some limita-
tions were noted. First of all, we assumed that the
included participants were reliable sources of informa-
tion about the topic [22]. However, information from
relevant academic literature was also included to supple-
ment the communities’ opinions. Secondly, the process
was labour intensive and expensive to conduct and thus,
may not be realistically implemented on a large scale.
Nevertheless, to elicit community participation, policy
planners are encouraged to implement selected aspects
of the presented process that they deem to be feasible.
Thirdly, some of the modifications incorporated into the
study communities’ pandemic plans may not be widely
generalizable to the broader population due to the
unique characteristics of the study communities [14].
Recommendations
Our research has various implications for pandemic
policy planners at all levels (i.e., community, regional,
provincial, and federal). Although incorporating expert
knowledge is imperative for pandemic planning at the
national level, flexibility is required at the community-
level to allow for plans to be adapted to address communi-
ties’ realities [17-20]. Research has displayed the importance
of addressing local and culturally important beliefs andvalues in pandemic plans to ensure community acceptance,
support, and compliance [2,21,22,47,48]. This is particularly
important for First Nations living in remote and isolated
communities due to their unique characteristics which may
impact their ability to respond to a public health emergency
[4-10]. The community engagement process that we
employed demonstrates that effectively engaging the com-
munity in pandemic planning is possible in a relatively short
time period [48]. Similar to the findings from other studies,
our results suggest that community members possess a
wealth of information from their personal experiences and
can provide invaluable insight about local values and beliefs
regarding public health emergencies [22,48].
Many methods exist to engage the public in pandemic
planning (e.g., surveys, qualitative methods, deliberative
forums, and social media); however, there is no consen-
sus on how public engagement should be acquired as
each method has its benefits and limitations
[18,21,22,24,26,48-51]. For instance, surveys and qualita-
tive methods (e.g., focus groups, interviews) have been
shown to inform policy decision-making by providing
public opinion about recommendations; however, a con-
cern is that the public may not completely understand
the complexity of the issue(s) [18,21,22]. Thus, to coun-
teract the concern of the public having a limited under-
standing of the issue, deliberative forums can be used in
conjunction as the participants are provided with
detailed information prior to eliciting their opinion.
Therefore, to offset the limitations and leverage the ben-
efits of methods used, we recommend using multiple
methods of public engagement in a complementary fash-
ion to gain a broader understanding of a community’s
views with regards to pandemic planning in order to pro-
duce the most effective plans [22].
Conclusions
Overall, it is important that pandemic plans address local
beliefs and values; therefore, it is imperative to engage
citizens in pandemic planning as they can provide in-
valuable insight into local perspectives. Furthermore, it is
especially important to engage and address concerns
voiced by disadvantaged populations, such as First
Nations living in remote and isolated communities, as
they experience unique living conditions and are pre-
dicted to be disproportionately impacted by a public
health emergency.
The employed community engagement process
involved interviews and meetings, and resulted in elicit-
ing and incorporating community-based input into the
pandemic plans of three remote and isolated First
Nations communities of sub-arctic Ontario, Canada.
Our results indicate that the community engagement
process successfully resulted in up-to-date, community-
informed, and culturally-appropriate community-level
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used alongside other methods of public engagement, in
addition to expert consultation, to create the most ef-
fective plans. Since pandemic plans are dynamic in na-
ture, the plans must be continually modified and
updated to meet the evolving needs of each community.
It is hoped that these modified pandemic plans will lay
the foundation for an improved pandemic response in
these remote and isolated First Nations communities.
Furthermore, the suggested modifications may help in-
form updates to the community-level pandemic plans of
other similar communities.
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